PRACA ORYGINALNA
Concept of hazard identification for RAMS specification
Więcej
Ukryj
1
Łukasiewicz Research Network – Poznan Institute of Technology, Institute, Polska
2
Poznan University of Technology, University, Polska
Data nadesłania: 11-12-2023
Data ostatniej rewizji: 20-12-2023
Data akceptacji: 26-12-2023
Data publikacji online: 28-12-2023
Data publikacji: 28-12-2023
Autor do korespondencji
Maciej Krzysztof Nowicki
Łukasiewicz Research Network – Poznan Institute of Technology, Institute, Estkowskiego 6, 61-755, Poznań, Polska
Rail Vehicles/Pojazdy Szynowe 2023,3-4,54-63
SŁOWA KLUCZOWE
DZIEDZINY
STRESZCZENIE
In parallel with the dynamic development of rail transport in terms of vehicle design, control systems, infrastructure issues, the development of processes and procedures in the area of safety management must also progress. This growing awareness was confirmed, among other things, by harmonising the content of the regulations on railway safety and interoperability, the safety certification of railway undertakings and the definition of the tasks and roles of national safety authorities. In effect, this was to enable the development of a single European railway area.
An implementation tool that allows for a systematic approach to safety management processes and that enables the above requirements to be met is, among other things, RAMS analyses. A key step in the safety management process for specifying RAMS is hazard identification, which is particularly highlighted in PN EN 50126-2:2018 through the holistic model for risk assessment and control of railway system hazards (hourglass model). It places the hazard identification process in two stages, i.e. in the early development stage of the analysis (similar to other known risk management models) and in the hazard control stage. This positioning alone indicates the importance of the hazard identification process. On the comprehensiveness and detail of its implementation depends the validity of the final outcome of the RAMS analysis. The development of such a process for real technical facilities in a way that is consistent with the needs of RAMS analyses and, at the same time, ensures that satisfactory results of these analyses are achieved, has become the subject of this article.
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